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Sunday, July 22, 2018
Last week, President Trump nominated federal appeals court judge Brett Kavanaugh to  ll
the Supreme Court seat opened by the retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy.
Immediately, coverage of the nomination focused on abortion and whether Judge
Kavanaugh’s con rmation would spell the end of the constitutional right recognized in Roe
v. Wade. Let’s explore why.
In 1973, the Supreme Court issued Roe. My students are often surprised to learn that the
decision was 7-2, and not one of the bitterly divided 5-4 blockbusters that have become
common in recent decades. And they are even more surprised to discover that  ve of the
seven justices in the Roe majority were appointed by Republican presidents, while one of
the two dissenting justices was appointed by a Democrat. Clearly, abortion politics have
undergone radical change since the 1970s.
Roe adopted a test that clearly spelled out whether, when and how states could limit access
to abortion. Under Roe, a woman possessed an unquali ed right to an abortion during the
 rst trimester of her pregnancy. During the second trimester, a state could regulate, but
only to protect the mother’s health. In the third trimester, when (as Roe put it) “the fetus
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb,” state
limitations or even bans on abortion were permissible except when necessary to preserve
the life or health of the mother.
The Constitution makes no mention of a right to abortion. But Roe said that it is a
component of “privacy” that is one of the unlisted fundamental “liberties” protected by the
due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Roe connected the abortion right to other
rights not spelled out in the text of the Constitution but nonetheless recognized as
fundamental in prior court decisions. Among these are rights to marriage, contraception,
family autonomy, child rearing and education.
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Roe has always faced strong criticism. Some critics focused on the trimester framework,
arguing that it was more an act of judicial legislation than an interpretation of the
Constitution. Others said that non-textual rights such as the one Roe recognized either
should not be treated as fundamental or should only be so recognized when deeply rooted
in the nation’s history and traditions (which, they said, the abortion right is not). Still others,
proceeding from the premise that human life begins at conception, saw Roe as nothing less
than an endorsement of homicide.
In 1980, Ronald Reagan campaigned for the presidency on a promise that he would
appoint Supreme Court justices who would overrule Roe. Between 1980 and 1992, six of
the seven justices in the Roe majority retired, and all of their replacements were named by
President Reagan or his successor, the  rst President Bush. Meanwhile, Justices William
Rehnquist and Byron White, the two Roe dissenters, remained on the court. Then, in 1989,
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, four of the court’s nine justices wrote or joined
opinions that either strongly criticized Roe or explicitly called for it to be overruled. Roe
appeared to be hanging by a thread.
In 1992, not long after conservative Justice Clarence Thomas had replaced liberal Justice
Thurgood Marshall, the court decided Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Casey involved a
challenge to the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania state law that placed a number of
restrictions on access to abortion. Many thought that the court would use Casey to overrule
Roe. But surprisingly, three justices appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush – Justices
Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy and David Souter – co-authored an unusual joint
opinion that served to retain quali ed constitutional protection for abortion rights by the
narrowest of margins.
Casey retreated from Roe by replacing its trimester framework with a test that asked simply
whether a law limiting access to abortion placed an “undue burden” on the abortion right.
As a consequence, a number of the provisions of the Pennsylvania law that would have
been unconstitutional under Roe – provisions imposing a 24-hour waiting period, requiring
that a woman seeking an abortion be provided with information about adoption and
requiring that a minor obtain the informed consent of a parent unless certain exceptions
applied – were upheld because a majority of the justices did not believe them to be unduly
burdensome.
But while suggesting that Roe was unsound in a number of ways, the joint opinion said that
grave institutional damage would be done if the court were to completely give in to the
long political campaign against it. It would be wrong, according to Justices O’Connor,
Kennedy and Souter, to abandon such an important precedent in circumstances where its
central holding had not been shown to be unworkable, its overruling would upset women’s
expectations about the availability of reproductive autonomy in planning their lives, and its
legal and factual premises had not been shown to be obsolete. Doing so would make the
court appear less a law court than an extension of the political branches.
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So, since 1992, the Constitution has been understood to contain a right to abortion that
protects against laws that are unduly burdensome. But an increasingly conservative court
has interpreted its undue-burden standard quite strictly.
In 2007, for example, the court in Gonzales v. Carhart upheld by a 5-4 vote the
constitutionality of a federal statute banning a procedure known by opponents as “partial-
birth abortion.” In doing so, the majority used language that many observers saw as
re ecting a serious hostility to the abortion right. Also, Gonzales was the  rst case
approving a regulation of abortion that did not contain an exception for the health of the
mother.
Then, in 2016, in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices
Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito declined on highly technical grounds to join a majority
(5-3) opinion striking down a Texas statute that imposed burdensome and unnecessary
regulatory requirements on facilities that perform abortion. The e ect of the law, had it
been upheld, would have been to reduce from 40 to 7 the number of such facilities in the
state. The legislative history of the law made clear that it was based on opposition to
abortion and not on a good-faith desire to make the procedure safer. Justice Kennedy
provided the  fth vote for the majority opinion holding the law unconstitutional.
Now, Justice Kennedy is gone, and President Trump has appointed Judge Kavanaugh to
take his place. If Judge Kavanaugh is con rmed, he will join a court containing the three
dissenters in Whole Women’s Health and Justice Neil Gorsuch, who has proved to be quite
conservative since joining the court in 2017. Thus, he could be the critical  fth vote to
overturn Roe/Casey.
So what does Judge Kavanaugh think about the abortion right? He has not yet addressed
the question directly, but he has publicly praised Justice Rehnquist for dissenting in Roe.
Also, he recently dissented from a court of appeals decision ordering that a minor alien
held in detention be provided immediate access to the abortion she desired. Perhaps
tellingly, his dissent used the loaded phrase “abortion on demand” – a phrase commonly
employed by abortion opponents – to describe what the girl was seeking.
In 1992, it looked as though the question of abortion rights would be de-constitutionalized
and left to the states. But in Casey, the court surprisingly preserved the core of the right
recognized in Roe. Perhaps the court will surprise again if Judge Kavanaugh is con rmed.
But there is very good reason to believe that Roe, as quali ed in Casey, is on life support.
(John Greabe teaches constitutional law and related subjects at the University of New
Hampshire School of Law. He also serves on the board of trustees of the New Hampshire
Institute for Civics Education.)
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